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Dretske on Knowledge Closure

Fred Dretske has long criticized the claim that empirical knowledge is closed under
(known) entailment. He rejects any closure principle, however qualified, implying that,
by knowing commonsense claims (such as I am in Boston) we are positioned to know
that skeptical scenarios do not hold, even if the former entail the latter. Among the
closure principles Dretske rejects is the following:
K:

If a subject S knows p, and S believes q because S knows that q is entailed
by p, then S knows q.

Dretske developed his main case against K (and restricted versions of K) in his early
essays [1970, 1971]. In recent work [2003] he offers fresh reasons for rejecting closure,
and revives aspects of his previous case, saying that given a proper understanding of
perceptual knowledge we will reject K.
Dretske’s main case against knowledge closure is well understood. I will briefly
review it and his recent objections, but my main concern here is to examine Dretske’s
attempt to indict knowledge closure on charges he also levels against the closure of
perception and perceptual knowledge. A good deal in his case is correct and important.
In fact, I will argue, understood one way, perceptual knowledge is not closed under
entailment; however, once we understand why, we are left with no reason to reject
knowledge closure.
So the plan is this: first we glance at Dretske’s old critique of closure, then his
recent objections, then we examine the case he bases on his account of perceptual
knowledge.
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The Old Case
Dretske’s main case against K has two components. The first rejects K on the basis of a
relevant alternatives account of knowledge. The other says rejecting K is the way to
resist skepticism.
First argument. On a relevant alternatives account ‘knowledge that p requires
one (or one’s evidence) to exclude not all, but only all relevant, alternatives to p.’
According to Dretske, such an account leads “naturally” but “not inevitably” to a failure
of knowledge closure. For it “commits” us to saying that
the evidence that (by excluding all relevant alternatives) enables me to know my
wife is on the sofa does not enable me to know that it is not a cleverly disguised
imposter since, in most circumstances at least, this is not a relevant alternative
[2003: 112-3].
As Dretske acknowledges [2003: 112], the relevant alternatives account is a weak
basis for denying K, for there are ways to reconcile the two [e.g., Stine 1976; Cohen
1988; Lewis 1996]. One way this can be done is as follows [Luper 1984; 1987].
First, we say that S’s knowing p is, roughly, S’s arriving at the belief p on the
basis of a reason R such that:
SI:

If R held, p would be true.

When condition SI holds, let us say that R is a safe indicator that p is true [for
refinements, see Luper 1987; 2003; for a similar approach, and the introduction of the
term ‘safety,’ see Sosa 1999; 2003; for a defense against recent objections, see Luper
2006]. Condition SI says p holds throughout the R worlds (worlds in which R holds) that
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are close to the actual world. The actual world is S’s situation as it is at the time S arrives
at the belief p via R [for clarification of ‘near possible world,’ see Stalnaker 1968; Lewis
1973; Nozick 1981: 680 note 8]. In adopting the safe indicator analysis, we position
ourselves to endorse K, since R safely indicates p only if R also safely indicates q, where
q is anything entailed by p.
Second, we say that an alternative to p, A, is relevant (relative to S and S’s
situation) if and only if:
RA:

In S’s circumstances, A might hold (i.e., it is false that: given S’s
circumstances A would not hold).

On this view, no alternative to p that is remote is relevant.
Third, we consider A ruled out on the basis of R when and only when:
SIR: were R to hold A would not hold.
This way of understanding relevance dovetails with the safe indication account
without raising any challenges to K. Suppose S knows p via R. Then not only can S rule
out p’s alternatives, relevant or otherwise, but q’s too, where p implies q. For assuming S
knows p via R, and p entails q, then if R held, the alternatives to q would not.
Moreover, our way of understanding relevance gives us intuitive results, as we
can illustrate using the Ginet-Goldman [1976] papier-mâché barn case. In this example, I
believe barn: there is a barn in front of me. However, as I look at the (real) barn in front
of me, the possibility that I am confronting a fake is relevant, since I am surrounded by
papier-mâché barns that look just like the real thing: in close possible worlds in which I
have the visual impressions which led me to believe a barn is there, I am seeing a fake.
By contrast, when I am in a part of the world that does not feature fake barns and the like,
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and I see a barn, the possibility that I am confronting a fake is not relevant, since in no
nearby possible world am I confronted with a fake. So I know in the latter, unGettierized situation and not in the former, Gettieresque situation.
On Dretske’s own view, an alternative A to p is relevant if and only if:
If not-p, A might hold.
Accordingly, alternatives to p that are remote are almost never relevant. For example, in
our un-Gettierized situation when I believe barn the possibility that I am seeing a fake is
not relevant. But for Dretske not-p is automatically a relevant alternative to p no matter
how remote not-p is. Hence his account of relevance is not consistent in ruling remote
possibilities as irrelevant. Being more consistent in this respect counts in favor of
understanding relevance in terms of RA, and since RA, combined with the safe indication
account of knowledge, preserves closure, it is hard to see that Dretske can plausibly claim
that the relevant alternatives account leads ‘naturally’ to a failure of knowledge closure.
(But consider the set of impressions, E, that, in the un-Gettierized barn case,
constitutes my evidence for believing barn. Is it plausible to say that E is also evidence
for thinking not-fake: it is false that I am confronting a fake barn and no real barn is
present at all? If not, doesn’t this suggest, as Dretske thinks, that evidence is not closed
under (known) entailment: we can have good evidence for a claim without having good
evidence for each of its consequences? And doesn’t this, in turn, suggest that we ought to
reject K? Admittedly, it does seem dubious to say that evidence is closed under
entailment. I will not try to settle this issue here. But why say that knowledge is closed
only if evidence is closed? A traditional foundationalist line of thought might appeal to
some version of the following principle:

4

I know q on the basis of p only if I am warranted in believing p on the basis of a
given set of evidence, and that evidence also warrants me in believing q.
If this foundationalist principle were true, knowledge really could be closed only if
evidence (or rather warrant) were. But Dretske is an externalist, and rejects such
traditional principles. Moreover, he provides no reason whatever for the view that
knowledge closure depends on evidence closure. In fact, he appears to reject such a
dependence when he says that ‘perceptual knowledge, if we have it, derives from the
circumstances in which one comes to believe, not one’s justification for the belief’ [2003:
105]. What enables me to know barn is the fact that E is a conclusive reason for barn,
not that E is good evidence for barn. Thus, on his view, coming to know q, where q is a
consequence of barn, is not a matter of E’s being good evidence for q.)
Second argument. Dretske also argued, much as Robert Nozick did later [1981],
that his account of knowledge allows us to come to terms with skepticism, but only if we
reject K and similar principles. Dretske said, roughly, that knowing p is a matter of
having a conclusive reason for believing p, where R is a conclusive reason for believing p
if and only if:
CR:

were p false, R would not hold.

Accepting the conclusive reasons account allows us to make a concession to
skepticism—namely, we do not know whether typical skeptical scenarios hold—without
succumbing to it: we still know ordinary knowledge claims, such as that I am in Boston,
since nothing stops us from having the requisite conclusive reasons. But if knowing is a
matter of having conclusive reasons, K fails, since having a conclusive reason for
believing something does not guarantee having a conclusive reason for believing p’s
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consequences. For example, my sensory information gives me a conclusive reason for
believing I am in Boston, but not for believing that my sensory input is not being fed to
me by aliens who have taken my brain to the planet Crouton and put it in a vat.
This second line of attack has met with considerable resistance. Several theorists
[e.g., BonJour 1987; Fumerton 1987; Feldman 1999] have claimed that any argument
against K should be rejected because its conclusion is absurd. Theorists [Cohen 1988;
Lewis 1996] have also pointed out that there are good strategies for resisting skepticism
without rejecting K. One example [Luper 1984; 2003] is this. If we accept the safe
indication account (that is, if we grant that it provides sufficient conditions for
knowledge), we will also accept K, primarily because something can safely indicate p
only if it also safely indicates the truth of p’s consequences. Moreover, the appeal of
skepticism is easily understood: the safety of a reason is much like the conclusiveness of
a reason; in fact, SI is the contraposition of CR [Luper 1984]. So CR and SI are easily
confused, and even if we accept SI, we might believe that we do not know we are not
brains in vats on far Crouton because we notice we do not meet CR, and fail to notice that
we do meet SI. On other occasions, when we embrace K, we will have SI in mind, which
sustains closure, not CR, which does not. Accepting the safe indication account gives us
the advantages of the conclusive reasons view—we explain (away) the appeal of (one
form of) skepticism without succumbing to it—without the disadvantage of having to
reject closure.

The Recent Objections
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So much for Dretske’s old critique of closure. His newer strategy is summed up in the
following passage:
Not only is [perception closure] false, none of our nonperceptual ways of coming
to know, none of our ways of preserving knowledge, and none of our ways of
extending it are closed under known implication. . . .If all this is so, if none of our
ways of knowing, extending knowledge or preserving knowledge are closed, it
seems odd to suppose that knowledge itself is closed. How is one supposed to get
closure on something when every way of getting, extending and preserving it is
open [2003: 113-4]?
Not only is perception not closed, many other items relevant to knowledge are not closed
either; Dretske goes on to provide a ‘small sample’ of these: testimony, proof, memory,
indication, and information. I will discuss perception closure in the next section. Putting
it aside for now, what should we make of Dretske’s suggestion that when we focus on the
many items by which knowledge is gained, preserved or extended, and notice that,
individually, they do not sustain closure, ‘it seems odd to suppose that knowledge itself is
closed’?
About at least two of the items he lists, information and indication, Dretske’s case
is unconvincing: he does not establish that these do not sustain closure on an individual
basis. Consider information. Dretske maintains that, normally, when a thermometer
registers 32 degrees on a Fahrenheit scale, it carries the information that temp: the
temperature is 32 degrees Fahrenheit. (A thermometer that registers 0 degrees Celsius
also carries the information that temp, though via a different scale.) Now, temp entails
that the following proposition, broken, is false:
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The temperature is 100 degrees Fahrenheit and the thermometer is broken.
Yet Dretske denies that the thermometer carries the information that not-broken holds.
This is probably because Dretske understands information in terms of conclusive reasons,
so that R carries the information that p is so only if, were p false, R would not hold.
However, there is no reason to account for information in terms of conclusive reasons,
which does not sustain closure, rather than safe indication, which does. On the latter
option, we say, roughly, that R carries the information that p when and only when, were
R to hold, p would also hold [Luper 1987], and we conclude that if a thermometer carries
the information that temp holds, it also carries the information that not-broken holds. (It
is true that a thermometer does not make it obvious that not-broken holds, but on both
accounts, conclusive reasons and safe indication, something can carry information
without making the information readily apparent: a book-length document might carry a
bit of information hidden deep in its pages, and intergalactic rays can carry information
about distant phenomena we cannot yet fathom.)
Not only does Dretske give us no reason to prefer his account of information, he
inadvertently supplies (in 1981) a reason to prefer the safe indication account. According
to Dretske, an account of information is adequate only if it upholds the following
condition: a signal carries the information that A is F for a person S if and only if the
conditional probability that A is F given S’s background knowledge is 1 (but less than 1
given S’s background knowledge alone—I set this parenthetical qualification aside).
Dretske’s claims about information are at odds with this condition (Jager 2004). Assume
that, given S’s (non-Gettierized) circumstances, barn-type percepts constitute a
conclusive reason for S to believe barn. On Dretske’s analysis, barn’s conditional
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probability is 1, and S’s percepts carry the information barn. Now, if the conditional
probability of a proposition p given r is 1, and p entails q, then the conditional probability
of q given r is 1. Since barn entails not-fake, not-fake’s conditional probability given S’s
percepts is 1, and, by Dretske’s adequacy condition, it had better turn out that S’s barntype percepts carry the information not-fake. Yet they do not, if we insist that they must
be conclusive reasons for not-fake. The safe indication account of information conforms
to the adequacy condition, if we put aside the parenthetical qualification, which we will
want to do, so as to ensure that knowing p on the basis of R coincides with R’s carrying
the information that p.
Now consider indication. As we have already seen, on the safe indication
account, indication is individually closed: R indicates that p is true only if R indicates
that p’s consequences are true. Yet Dretske claims that tracks in the snow indicate that a
deer is in the woods and not that (say) all the deer in the woods have not been replaced
with simulacra. Presumably Dretske says this because he thinks that indication should be
understood in terms of conclusive reasons, thus: R’s indicating p amounts to R’s not
holding if p were false. Yet analyzing indication in terms of safety is at least as plausible
as analyzing indication as Dretske would.
But suppose Dretske were correct in saying that all or some of his items fail to
sustain closure on an individual basis. Suppose we follow him in rejecting the following
principles:
-- If S has received testimony that p and (believes q because) p entails q, then S has
received testimony that q.
-- If S has proven p and (believes q because) p entails q, then S has proven q.
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-- If S remembers p and (believes q because) p entails q, then S remembers q.
As Dretske knows, the falsity of these principles would not constitute good grounds for
rejecting K. In the matter of knowledge closure, the issue is not whether these principles
are true, but rather whether knowledge by testimony, proof or memory positions us to
know the consequences of the things we know. What is relevant is whether the following
principle, suitably qualified, is true:
T:

If S knows p via testimony, or proof, or memory, and believes q because p
entails q, then S knows q.

This principle is not only intuitive, it can be supported if knowledge is safe indication. If,
for example, your testimony is, under the circumstances, a safe indicator that p is so, then
it, with or without the deduction of q from p, is also a safe indicator that q is so, where q
is any consequence of p.
Certainly, T will need qualification, and some necessary modifications may
indicate the need to qualify K. But it is worth reminding ourselves that Dretske’s central
project is to explain why our knowledge of commonsense claims does not position us to
know that skeptical scenarios do not hold; he means to reject any closure principle,
however qualified, that implies that we may arrive at antiskeptical knowledge given our
knowledge of commonsense claims. To that end, it is not enough for Dretske to show
that K (or T) must be qualified, for even on various qualified versions of K we may arrive
at antiskeptical knowledge.

The Case Based on Perception

10

According to Dretske [2003: 108], ‘perception teaches us’ that the following principles
(with or without the parenthetical qualifications) are false (Dretske himself formulates the
former, but he clearly means to reject the latter as well):
P:

If S perceives p, and (S believes q because) S knows that p entails q, then
S perceives q.

PK:

If S knows p via perception, and (S believes q because) S knows that p
entails q, then S knows q via perception.

Perception also teaches us to reject K, the closure of ‘factual’ (empirical) knowledge
[2003: 112]. In its broadest outlines this case against P, PK, and K has two main steps.
First. Dretske thinks he can show that we do not perceive or know the truth of
certain sorts of propositions he calls ‘limiting propositions’ [2003: 112]. This set of
claims is not clearly delineated, but many of Dretske’s ‘limiting propositions’ refer to
situations with a feature we might call elusiveness. A situation sk is elusive to me when
the following is true: were sk not to hold, I would still have the experiences I have now.
A familiar example is that I am not a brain in a vat being fed my present sensory input.
Another example arises when I look at a cookie jar in my kitchen. The example is notrayed: I am not standing in a jar-free kitchen undergoing a cookie jar hallucination
caused by a ray from a passing alien spaceship.
Second. Dretske also thinks he can show that we do perceive and know thereby
all sorts of ordinary contingent claims that entail ‘limiting propositions’. An example he
gives is jar—I am confronting a jar containing cookies—which entails not-rayed.
If we do not perceive or know elusive claims, but we do perceive and know
ordinary claims that entail elusive claims, we have to reject P, PK and K. Recapping:
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I.

We perceive and know that various ordinary contingent claims (such as jar) hold.

II.

We neither perceive nor know that elusive claims (such as not-rayed) hold.

III.

Elusive claims are entailed by some of the ordinary claims we perceive and by
some of the ordinary claims we know.

IV.

So P, PK, and K are false.

So much for the main structure of Dretske’s case; now let us consider the details.
To support I, Dretske relies on intuitions about what we perceive and know
through perception. He thinks it is intuitively plausible to say that we perceive, and know
thereby, the truth of ordinary contingent claims.
Dretske also defends II on intuitive grounds. He thinks our intuitions support
both of the following claims:
IIA.

We do not perceive that elusive claims hold.

IIB.

We do not know via perception that elusive claims hold.

Furthermore, in underwriting IIB, our intuitions suggest something stronger, for IIB, he
thinks, supports the following claim:
IIC.

We do not know that elusive claims hold.

So far, Dretske’s case for I and II is based on intuitions and the suggestion that
IIB supports IIC. But I and II can be further supported if we can find an analysis of
perception and perceptual knowledge that underwrites the intuitive plausibility of IIA and
IIB. Dretske thinks the conclusive reasons account is precisely what is needed.
According to Dretske, in S’s perceiving that p, and in S’s knowing p via
perception, the key element is, roughly, S’s possessing a set of experiences E that
constitute a conclusive reason for p (Dretske adds refinements we can ignore for the sake

12

of simplicity). On this account of perception and perceptual knowledge, S perceives, and
knows via perception, that jar holds: if jar were false, some situation that is every bit as
mundane as jar would hold, such as the situation in which S is confronting an ordinary
jar containing no cookies, and in that case S would not have the experiences E associated
with jar. Dretske’s account also allows us to say that S’s perceiving, and knowing
perceptually, that jar holds does not require that S have experiences S would lack if rayed
held. For even if jar were false rayed would not hold; some mundane situation would
hold, and S would lack E. Finally, Dretske’s account of perception and perceptual
knowledge backs what we said about elusive possibilities: on his view, perceiving, and
knowing via perception, that not-rayed holds, while I examine the jar of cookies in front
of me, requires that I meet the following condition: if rayed held, I would not have my
cookie-jar-in-front-of-me experiences. But I would.

We now have before us Dretske’s case against P, PK and K, which rests finally on his
arguments for IIA, IIB, and IIC. Let us examine each of these three arguments in turn.
IIA. Dretske says we do not perceive that elusive possibilities hold. His
explanation rests on the acceptability of the conclusive reasons account of perception,
according to which perceiving p requires having experiences E that constitute a
conclusive reason for p. His thought is that our experiences will not be conclusive
reasons for believing elusive claims. However, Dretske’s account is no better than a safe
indication account of perception, according to which perceiving p is roughly having
experiences that safely indicate that p is true. On this latter theory, in principle there is
nothing to stop us from perceiving that elusive claims hold. For example, in non-
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Gettieresque circumstances, my jar-before-me experiences safely indicate not just the
truth of jar, but also of not-rayed.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to doubt that we perceive the truth of elusive
claims. We might accept naïve perceptual representationalism, which says that we
perceive p only if we form a perceptual representation of the way things are if p holds.
On this view, we might well doubt that we perceive the truth of elusive claims on the
grounds that we rarely if ever form perceptual representations of elusive situations. It is
plausible to say one can form (say) a visual representation of the fact that jar holds: one
comes to have a visual impression of a jar, together with an impression of one’s body and
its spatial relationship to the jar, and so forth. But forming a visual representation that
not-rayed holds, or that any other elusive possibility holds, is far from straightforward.
However, it seems possible to make sense of perceiving that elusive claims hold.
We have only to adapt Dretske’s own distinction between primary (or direct) perception
and secondary (or indirect) perception [1969: 78-88, 153-163]. Imagine a physicist
looking at a tract of bubbles in a cloud chamber. She cannot see electrons, so she cannot
directly see that electrons are moving through the medium within the instrument. But she
sees the bubbles, and that a series of bubbles is appearing in the instrument; furthermore,
it is reasonable to think that she can see that the electrons are moving by seeing that the
bubbles are forming in a specific sort of way. She sees the former indirectly by seeing
the latter directly. Let us say that S has primary perception that something A has feature
F roughly when:
1. S perceives A
2. S’s belief that A is F is caused by S’s experiences E
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3. E safely indicate that A is F.
Let us further stipulate that S has secondary perception that something B (distinct from
A) has feature G roughly when:
4. S has primary perception that A is F
5. The fact that A is F is a safe indicator that B is G
6. S’s belief that B is G is caused by S’s perceiving primarily that A is F.
Accordingly, a physicist might (1) perceive bubbles; (2) have experiences E’ that bring
about the belief that the bubbles have certain features F’, under conditions given which
(3) E’ safely indicate that the bubbles have F’. Satisfying (1)-(3), she satisfies (4): she
has primary knowledge that the bubbles have F’. The fact that the bubbles have F’ is a
safe indicator that electrons are moving in the cloud chamber, as (5) demands. So,
assuming that her belief about the electrons is caused by her primary perception that the
bubbles have F’, as (6) requires, she perceives secondarily that electrons are moving in
the chamber.
There is no reason in principle why secondary perception should not grade off
into tertiary perception, and perhaps even higher levels. Thus, for example, the physicist
might see that electrons are moving through her cloud chamber even though she is
watching from an adjoining room using a camera trained on her device. Hence we will
want to say that S perceives q on level n if and only if either n = 1 and S primarily
perceives p, or n > 1 and the following conditions are met:
7. S perceives p on level n-1
8. The fact p is a safe indicator that q
9. S’s belief q is caused by S’s perceiving p on level n-1.
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The upshot is clear: indirectly, we can perceive that some elusive claims hold.
Having primary perception of the fact that jar holds positions us to have secondary
perception of the fact that rayed does not hold. What is more, a fairly straightforward
closure principle applies to perception, namely:
PS:

If S perceives p, and S is caused to believe q by perceiving p, and p entails
q, then S perceives q.

We have shown that, by replacing Dretske’s conclusive reasons account of
perception with the safe indication account, we can make good sense of perceiving the
truth of elusive claims. But before we accept either account, let us register one
reservation: it may be that both accounts of perception are too strong. Recall the papiermâché barn example. I believe there is a barn in front of me because, looking right at it, I
see it is there, yet, unbeknownst to me, the neighborhood is full of papier-mâché barns
that look just like the real thing. In Goldman’s scenario, it is clear that I fail to know a
barn is there, but it seems just as clear that I see that a barn is in front of me. Yet on the
conclusive reasons and safe indication accounts, I fail to see that the barn is there, for,
given the proximity of the fakes, I might I have had my barn-in-front-of-me experiences
without a barn being present.
Our intuitions about Goldman’s example suggest that it involves genuine
perception, which, in turn, suggests rejecting our account (and Dretske’s as well).
However, there is another option. It also seems intuitively plausible to say that
perceiving (or at least seeing) p entails knowing p, as several theorists, including Dretske
[2003: 108, note 3; 1969: 124; and Williamson 2002], have suggested. If the entailment
thesis is true—if perceiving p entails knowing p—then there is perception failure in
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Goldman’s example after all (since there is clearly knowledge failure). If we embrace
our intuitions about the entailment thesis, we must reject our intuitions about perception
failure in the Goldman example. Rejecting the latter intuitions seems preferable,
inasmuch as embracing the former allows us to unify our accounts of perception and
perceptual knowledge: we can explain both in terms of safe indication. For the safe
indication account of perception is entirely consistent with the entailment thesis.
Thus, we are led back to the safe indication account of perception, and on that
account it is possible to perceive that elusive claims hold, contrary to IIA.
IIB. We turn to Dretske’s view that we do not know via perception that elusive
possibilities hold. Now, it is critical to notice that ‘we know p via perception’ can mean
more than one thing. Consider the following notions:
S has noninferential perceptual knowledge that p if and only if, in knowing p, S
relies strictly on perception (perception that is not supplemented by any form of
inference, deductive or nondeductive).
S has inferential perceptual knowledge that p if and only if, in knowing p, S
infers p from something (or some things) of which S has noninferential perceptual
knowledge.
S has perceptually based knowledge that p if and only if S has either
noninferential or inferential perceptual knowledge that p.
When we say a person S knows p via perception, we might mean that S has nonferential
perceptual knowledge that p. But we might also mean that S has perceptually based
knowledge that p. Therefore, IIB might mean either of the following:
IIB1

We lack noninferential perceptual knowledge of elusive claims.
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IIB2

We lack perceptually based knowledge of elusive claims.

To evaluate Dretske’s position, then, we will need to ask whether he can support each
claim the way he defends IIB. That is, we must ask whether he can defend IIB1 and IIB2
by noting that each is intuitively plausible, and suggesting that the intuitiveness of each is
best explained in terms of the conclusive reasons account of perceptual knowledge. Let
us start with IIB1.
IIB1 is intuitively plausible. But the explanation has nothing to do with the
conclusive reasons account of perceptual knowledge. Strict (wholly noninferential)
perceptual knowledge presumably has a perception component and a knowledge
component. That is, S knows p strictly via perception when and only when the following
conditions hold:
(a)

S perceives p (the perception component)

(b)

S knows p (the knowledge component)

(c)

S’s perceiving p is what positions S to know p (i. e., S’s meeting condition
(a) is what positions S to meet condition (b)).

To explain why it seems difficult to achieve noninferential perceptual knowledge of
elusive claims we have only to point out two things. First, knowing p strictly via
perception entails perceiving that p holds. Second, as noted earlier, it is tempting to
accept naïve perceptual representationalism, according to which perceiving p entails
forming a perceptual representation of the fact p. Together these two points suggest that
we do not perceive elusive claims, for it is hard to accept that we form perceptual
representations of elusive situations.
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So much for why IIB1 strikes us as intuitively plausible. Now recall that we have
rejected naïve representationalism in favor of the safe indication account of perception,
and on that theory nothing stands in the way of strict perceptual knowledge of elusive
claims. Appearances to the contrary, then, IIB1 is false.
Even if we analyze the knowledge component of noninferential perceptual
knowledge in terms of safe indication rather than conclusive reasons, we still must reject
closure as applied to knowledge strictly via perception. That is, the following principle
(with or without the parenthetical qualification) is false:
PKS: If S knows p strictly via perception, and (S believes q because) S knows
that q is entailed by p, then S knows q strictly via perception.
PKS is trivially false. It is false because no inferential belief counts as ‘noninferential
perceptual knowledge.’
As for IIB2: I suggest that Dretske’s explanation of its plausibility fails. For an
alternative explanation is at least as good: IIB2 is false, but for reasons that are easily
overlooked. Suppose we accept the safe indication account of perceptual knowledge.
Then we know many different elusive claims (such as not-rayed) indirectly, by inference
from other claims we know strictly on the basis of perception, such as jar. IIB2 is then
false. Yet it is easy to see how we might be led to accept IIB2. We might find ourselves
confused in one of two ways. First. On the safe indication view, we know an elusive
claim via perception only if we satisfy condition SI. It is easy to confuse SI, which we
satisfy, with CR, which we fail to satisfy. Second. As we said earlier, naïve
representationalism suggests we do not know that elusive claims hold via noninferential
perception. If this kind of knowledge failure were actual, it would be easily confused
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with a second kind of knowledge failure: our inability to know elusive claims even if we
supplement strict perceptual knowledge with inference.
Finally, let us add that the safe indication account of perceptual knowledge has an
important advantage over the conclusive reasons account: the former, unlike the latter,
positions us to accept the closure of perceptually based knowledge. It enables us to
endorse something like the following principle:
PKI:

If S has perceptually based knowledge that p (i.e., S has either
noninferential or inferential perceptual knowledge that p), and S believes q
because S knows that q is entailed by p, then S has perceptually based
knowledge that q.

IIC. Dretske thinks that IIC, the assertion that elusive claims are not known, is
supported by IIB, the view that we cannot know elusive claims via perception. However,
IIB, we have said, can mean IIB1 (we lack noninferential perceptual knowledge of
elusive claims) or IIB2 (we lack perceptually based knowledge of elusive claims). We
must take this complication into account in interpreting Dretske. Does he mean that IIB1
supports IIC or does he mean that IIB2 supports IIC?
Now, IIB2 really would support IIC. For IIB2 implies not just that we do not
know elusive claims strictly on the basis of perception, but also that we do not know
elusive claims even if we help ourselves to what we can infer from things we know
strictly on the basis of perception. It is very hard to see how else we can know elusive
claims. However, we have already shown that IIB2 is false. So it is no good to defend
IIC on the basis of IIB2.
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In any case, in saying that IIC is supported by IIB, it is fairly clear that Dretske
did not mean that IIB2 supports IIC. Like many philosophers, Dretske adopts a
definition, more or less by stipulation, by which ‘perceptual knowledge’ is equated with
what we have called ‘noninferential perceptual knowledge’ [1969: 159]. In asserting that
IIB supports IIC, then, he clearly means to say that IIB1 supports IIC. Unfortunately, it is
not at all clear that IIB1 does support IIC. Of course, the main difficulty is that IIB1 is
false, as we argued earlier. But suppose it were true: suppose we did not perceive that
elusive claims hold. It would follow that we did not know that they held by perceiving
that they held. But why should this lead us to rule out knowing elusive claims by some
other means? Why, in particular, should we rule out knowing elusive claims by deducing
them from other claims we know strictly via perception? Unless we conflate IIB1 with
IIB2, it is hard to see how IIB1 provides any support whatever for IIC, much less grounds
for rejecting K.
In closing, let me briefly discuss one other argument for IIC that Dretske hints at.
At one point he says it would be bizarre to think we can know a ‘limiting proposition’ by
deducing it from one of the ordinary claims we know, but he does not say why [2003:
112]. However, I suspect he is completing a thought he began much earlier in his essay:
there are always things my knowledge depends on, facts without which my beliefs
would be false, that I cannot justify. So the knowledge, if I have it, must be the
product of things I need not know or be justified in believing. [2003: 106]
Among the things that help produce knowledge is the truth of various ‘limiting
propositions’:
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One doesn’t have to be justified in thinking that the world was not created in the
way Russell imagines in order to remember—hence, know—facts about the past.
It is the fact that Russell’s hypothesis is false, not one’s justification for thinking
it false, that enables one to remember what one had for breakfast. [2003: 106]
Dretske thinks that, to know an ordinary claim p, we must meet certain conditions,
among them the requirement that the ‘limiting propositions’ that entail p are true. But we
meet this requirement, and all other requirements for knowing p, without being
positioned to know, or warranted in believing, the ‘limiting propositions.’ In a sense, he
seems to think, in knowing the ordinary claim p, we merely presuppose the truth of the
‘limiting propositions.’ And under such conditions, we cannot come to know the
‘limiting propositions’ by inferring them from the ordinary claim p.
But why not? Is it that we lack justification (‘justification’ in the traditional
sense) for p? That seems unlikely, since Dretske is a thoroughgoing externalist who
thinks that knowledge does not require justification.
Perhaps he thinks we cannot come to know any claim q by deducing it from
another claim p which we know if our knowing p depends on q’s truth. Maybe this
pattern of inference (call it pseudocircular reasoning) strikes him as objectionable. But if
so, Dretske owes us an explanation. And in explaining himself he will be unable to fall
back on his view that knowledge requires conclusive reasons. For that view does not rule
out knowledge via pseudocircular reasoning. It does not even rule out knowledge of
‘limiting propositions’ via pseudocircular reasoning. At best, it rules out knowledge of
elusive claims via pseudocircular reasoning, simply because we lack conclusive reasons
for believing elusive claims whether our reasoning is pseudocircular or not. (Even this is

22

an overstatement, for nothing in the nature of conclusive reasons stops us from casting
things we know in the role of conclusive reasons which position us to know further
things, which would allow us to know elusive claims through applications of K. For
example, we can start with our knowledge that we are not in vats, and conclude that we
know we are not brains in vats. Our visual percepts give us conclusive reason to believe
we are not in vats, and our not being in vats is conclusive reason to believe we are not
brains in vats.) By way of illustration, consider two examples. In both we have a
conclusive reason for believing something, and we arrive at that belief via pseudocircular
reasoning. The second is a ‘limiting proposition,’ while the first is not, as far as I can tell
(again: Dretske’s term is not precise). Neither is an elusive claim.
First example: I can have a conclusive reason for believing I am alive after
inferring it from my belief (whose truth I know) that I am typing. If I were not alive, I
would not have the experiences that led me to believe I am typing, nor the belief that led
me to conclude that I am alive. Yet I must be alive if I am to know I am typing.
Second example: Dretske thinks There are physical objects is a ‘limiting
proposition.’ However, I can have a conclusive reason for believing that there are
physical objects, even if I infer it from my belief (whose truth I know) that there is a jar
of cookies in front of me. If there were no physical objects, I would not have my belief,
my jar-of-cookies-in-front-of-me experiences, or any other experiences, for that matter,
since I would not exist.
In view of these examples, one could easily cite the conclusive reasons view in
support of the possibility of knowledge via pseudocircular reasoning. If he really means
to reject the latter anyway, Dretske needs to tell us why.

23

Let us summarize the discussion. First, we have defended the safe indication account of
perception as against Dretske’s conclusive reasons account. On our approach we can
perceive, indirectly, that elusive claims hold, and perception is closed in the following
sense:
PS:

If S perceives p, and S is caused to believe q by perceiving p, and p entails
q, then S perceives q.

Second, we rejected Dretske’s conclusive reasons account of perceptual knowledge in
favor of the safe indication account. If, like Dretske, we go on to define ‘perceptual
knowledge’ to mean noninferential perceptual knowledge, we still allow for the
perception of elusive claims, but we must deny that perceptual knowledge is closed under
(known) entailment. That is, the following version of PK is trivially false:
PKS: If S knows p noninferentially via perception, and S believes q because S
knows that q is entailed by p, then S knows q noninferentially via
perception.
However, if we understand ‘perceptual knowledge’ to mean perceptually based
knowledge, which embraces things we know by inference from claims known strictly via
perception, then we know elusive claims via perception, and perceptually based
knowledge is closed under entailment:
PKI:

If S has perceptually based knowledge that p, and S believes q because S
knows that q is entailed by p, then S has perceptually based knowledge
that q.
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Finally, if we adopt the safe indication account of factual knowledge, K is true.
Apparently, nothing about perception teaches us otherwise.
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